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Leo Zeilig © 2004


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Part 2
Click here for Part I

The strategy was a stunning triumph. The AFDL led by Laurent Kabila seemed to sweep all before him as he marched on Mobutu’s seat of power in Kinshasa. His movement backed by Ugandan and Rwanda had marched more than two thousand kilometres across the country. However there was what might seem a bizarre twist to Kabila's march to power. Although he could be seen on international television networks throughout 1996-7 lambasting imperialist powers, his Alliance was a travelling trade-fair. While Mobutu might have had only token legality as president in 1996, mining companies wasted no time to carve up the Congo with the rebel leader. De Beers and American Mineral Fields signed contracts with Kabila that were worth an estimated $3 billion a year. The UK newspaper The Times reported on the 22 April 1997 days before Kabila's final victory that “mining multinationals have signed billion-dollar deals for mineral rights with Laurent Kabila, Zaire’s rebel leader, to get ahead in what is being billed as the ‘second scramble’ for Africa' Executives with the companies said that they are happy to do business with rebels, who control all of Zaire's mineral resources other than its off-shore oilfields, because they do not ask for bribes...The unusual alliance between big business and revolutionaries, many of whom were Chinese-trained Maoists and Marxists in their youth.” Despite the peculiarities of the environment businesses were not deterred. Kenneth Macleod president of International Panorama Resource Corporation of Vancouver made the connections between the war and the business opportunities explicit at the time, “We are going to capitalise on the current strife by increasing our presence and our land holdings in the country”.[21]

In May 1997 Kabila’s travelling consortium of international business interests and revolutionaries finally won. The movement that had culminated in the triumphant and popular seizure of the capital, asserted its confidence by even erasing the country’s name: Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the second time (having been change to Zaire by Mobutu). Ludo Martens gives a sense of the general rejoicing “students, who yesterday were still Tshisekedistes [opposition figure], held paper where there had scribbled the name of Kabila, their new hero. The image of very young soldiers, after a march of 2,000 km, astonished to be in such a large town. The corpses of ex-FAR soldiers, the Red Cross would say later that there was in all of Kinshasa 200 dead. A far cry from the feared confrontation between the Presidential Guard and the AFDL, which could have caused thousands of deaths”.[22]

The ‘official opposition’ that had been struggling against the regime almost continuously since 1989 dampened the rejoicing. The main party of the opposition was the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) led by Tshisekedi wa Muluma. Mobutu had been playing a game of cat and mouse with an array of opposition parties and personalities for five years, denying their legitimacy, convening a National Conference and then dissolving it. On the eve of the rebel victory the national Assembly, with Mobutu’s backing, appointed Tshisekedi as Prime Minster. In a gesture towards the encroaching rebels Tshisekedi left 6 seats vacant in the cabinet in the hope that they would join him. Tshisekedi had important popular support in Kinshasa - a poll in March 1997 showed that despite Kabila’s popularity he was seen to lack the electoral credibility which Tshisekedi commanded.[23]

Kabila in power

Kabila’s triumph concealed contradictions in the movement of which he had become the new figurehead. In power, Kabila slammed into the contradictions in short order. First, the new government faced the problem of fixing a broken state that sought to balance popular demands and foreign interests. As we have seen the country was awash with multinational deals and joint ventures in the first six months of 1997. They promised to advance the capital necessary to ensure the success of the first African joint ventures. Consolidated Eurocan Ventures, from the international firm Lundin, proposed the exploitation of copper and cobalt from Tenke Fungurume in Katanga – a reserve with the highest quality of copper and cobalt in the world. The Canadian company Barrick Gold Corporation – the second largest company involved in gold extraction after Anglo-American were interested in the deposits of gold in Kilo Moto. Another Canadian company Banro Resources acquired Sominki (Société miniere du Kivu) whose deposits were rich in gold and colombo-tantalite (coltan), that was fast becoming the most prized mineral in the world. As for American mineral Fields – their representatives signed three agreements totalling nearly a billion dollars for the extraction of cooper and cobalt in Kilwezi, cobalt in Kipushi and the construction of a factory for the treatment of Zinc in Kipushi. As Colette Braeckman writes “In Kisangani AMF already had acquired an office to buy diamonds, and in Lubumbashi the company demonstrated their generosity to the rebels, who benefited by an ‘advance’ of 50 million dollars ... to finance the war still being fought and to secure a date for transactions in the future”.[24]

But the mining industry was in complete disarray. The euphoria of having chased Mobutu out of the country disguised the fact that the ten previous years had seen the almost complete collapse of the economy. State looting between 1991-1993 had destroyed industry; the rupture with global financial institutions consummated in 1992 had presented the country with further obstacles to fresh funds. The production of copper, which had reached 500,000 tones and 17,000 tones for cobalt at the end of the 1980s, was now only 37,000 and 3,800 tones respectively in 1997.[25]

Despite the lack of experience the new government launched an ambitious programme for the reinvestment and reconstruction of agriculture and industry by the end of the year. Kabila made it clear that the state was going to play a central role in the implementation of the programme. He sought to maintain a populist nationalism, and among other gestures he printed Lumumba’s effigy on the new bank notes. The plan did not meet with the approval of the World Bank and IMF, whose pressure he resisted in 1998. It was clear to the government that the war, which sought to unseat him the following year, was partly financed by foreign companies who desired for Rwanda and Uganda to install another leader, more open to their interests, as Braeckman writes “plus au fait de l‘economie moderne.”[26]

Kabila promised full and democratic multiparty elections within two years but before long, the regime’s behaviour seemed to many to replicate Mobutu’s. His movement that had been supported and fought by the Banyamulenge turned on them. The regime failed to grant the elusive status that they had long desired. The omens were not good. Kabila’s behaviour towards opponents and democratic politics had more that a whiff of the ancien regime. A large number of human right activists and opposition figures were forced to flee the country between 1997-1998. But the regime displayed a more worrying descent into ethnic politics, using the ethnic hatred that had been so devastatingly stirred up during the Rwandan genocide. Kabila fell back on his ‘clansmen’ from southern Katanga. Guillaume Ngefa, president of the Congolese African Association for Human Rights (ASADHO) explained the process “As he [Kabila] has descended into corruption and nepotism, he has left himself with only the tribal card to play”.[27]

His opponents criticised the government for the continued presence of Rwandan troops in the country and their advisors in the government. Kabila was faced with a choice: face down his detractors or turn his back on his old backers. He opted for the latter. In an extraordinary reversal he turned on the Rwandans. The consequences of this decision were apocalyptic. In order to take on the Rwandans the government was forced to make alliances with Hutu militias in the east. Events quickly degenerated; in August 1998 Rwanda made their own alliance with an anti-Kabila militia the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Uganda joined the fray and the alliance looked set to overturn Kabila a little over a year after his victory. Ludo Martens puts a romantic gloss to the attack, “In the Congo in the past you rarely saw an army encircle a city without the people panicking and shutting themselves up in their houses. But in three weeks Kabila had realised a veritable miracle. With their bare hands in all the neighbourhoods, in all the streets the youth have raised themselves to attack and kill the rebel intruders”.[28]

Behind Martens’ popular resistance was a much nastier reality - the avid continuation of Mobutu’s ethno-politics. On the eve of Kabila’s ‘miraculous’ uprising, he incited the population, “Everyone must be ready to confront the enemy. In each village people must arm themselves, even with traditional arms, bows and arrows. The aim is to erase the enemy, otherwise we will become slaves to these little Tutsis.”[29] The end of August was punctuated by anti-Tutsi massacres. Ethnic divide and rule was not the behaviour you would expect from a committed panafricanist, or anyone who the previous year had depended on these ‘little Tutsis’ for his victory.

Intervention and the second war: the case of Zimbabwe

The regime’s long-term survival required more. Kabila assembled an array of his own backers.  Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supplied troops and supplies that prevented the government from immediate danger and repelled the attack on Kinshasa. He also picked up support from Mayi-Mayi rebels. Although it is doubtful that these countries were motivated by supported for a fellow nationalist, it is equally questionable that their only consideration was the plunder of Congo’s wealth. The case of Zimbabwe is illustrative of their motivations and the development of the war.

The transformation in the relationship between the two countries in a very short space of time was remarkable. Prior to 1996 the country had few trade links with the DRC but by 2000 there were multiple joint ventures across several sectors of the economy. Still the reasons for the intervention were complicated and not initially related to commercial trade. The country's president Robert Mugabe was eager to prove his credentials as the foremost leader of the SADC and, having leant Kabila several million dollars for his war, intervention was a convenient way of ensuring that debts were repaid. Mugabe had donated $5 million to Kabila - a long-time associate - that was intended to finance his rebellion. Days before the final push on Kinshasa Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) sealed a $53 million deal for the supply of food, uniforms and weaponry.[30]

Mugabe's support for the government of the DRC has been rewarded by the gift of vast areas of land. Army generals and businessmen have been were granted contracts on mines and in logging companies.  One company, run by leading members of the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has been granted what Global Witness calls the world's largest logging concession by gaining rights to exploit 33 million hectares of forests - an area ten times the size of Switzerland.[31]

However these facts conceal a more complicated reality. According to Michael Nest there is little evidence Zimbabwean state agencies were systematically involved in criminal activities. Regional networks that included local businessman and individuals did engage in diamond smuggling and trade with military officials from the ruling party ZANU-PF, but the very informality of these criminal networks mitigated against a consistent and large scale exploitation of resources under the control of the Zimbabwean army.[32]  These conclusions were subsequently confirmed by the UN report on resource exploitation in the Congo, where they argued that available production and export statistics did not reveal much suspicious behaviour. The commercial activity that did take place followed, rather than precipitated, the intervention. Nor was it the case that the commerce that eventually took place was undertaken by courageous entrepreneurs; on the contrary, the government had to cajole local businesses and urge on a reluctant and questioning private sector. The business that took place seems to have been parasitic on military intervention.[33]

There was another factor in the intervention. Zanu-PF had introduced an Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme in 1991, a programme that had a dramatic and devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s economic fate; along with the retrenchments and deregulation that followed ESAP, the reduction in import taxes generated an interest in export markets. The decline in the Zimbabwe economy, evident the year after the implementation of the ESAP, saw a huge 11 percent fall in per capita GDP.[34] The liberalisation of the economy, which led inter alia to the increase in inflation and decline in exports, generated an increase in domestic interest in the DRC.  John Mangudya of ZimTrade in 2000 expressed the harsh conditions in the country following adjustment and the various motivations for war among private and state capitalists, “Within Zimbabwe the small and medium guys were being squeezed out. Thus they are being forced to look outwards. Big (private) Zimbabwe companies, in contrast, think that the margins are low, that there is too much risk. Big (state-owned) companies like the Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) are game because of political motivations”.[35] It was the military that was able to establish business networks with existing middlemen that were in turn used by entrepreneurs after they had been prodded into action by the government.  Frequently in place of Zimbabwean businesses it was members of the Zimbabwean Defence Force who made use of their virtual monopoly of networks in the DRC and set up commercial outfits. As the war continued to spread so did these networks and the possibilities for the Zimbabwean military to control them. Their strategic position in the regions under their command, concentrated on trunk roads, airports and border crossings, ensured that they could maximise their influence on informal and local trading networks.

What were these networks? They were comprised essentially of middlemen; many based in Lubumbashi  - the city that sits on the border with Zambia, making it the closest commercial centre in the DRC for Zimbabwe. These men were frequently well-rooted and long-standing expatriates in the DRC, often Greek, Belgian, Indian, Lebanese or Pakistani. Although many had ‘shop fronts’ in the city where they imported food and consumer goods behind them there were ‘illicit’ business interests in diamond, gold and currency trading. They were indispensable to Zimbabweans. Their ‘internationalism’ meant that they spoke English and their local knowledge guaranteed access into unreachable parts of the DRC. These ‘middlemen’ had access to other ethnic-based networks with entrepreneurs in Kinshasa, Mbuji Mayi – a mining centre - and with local and national officials. The exploitation of commercial interests by Zimbabwe was not only limited to small-scale entrepreneurs riding on the back of the military. There were substantial large-scale interests involved. The most notorious were invariably those who were connected to the Zanu-PF regime. The transport millionaire Billy Ractenbach with a record of supporting Mugabe's government became the Chief Executive of the DRC mining group Gecamines. He secured a near-monopoly for his company Ridgepointe Overseas Developments Ltd transporting supplies to the DRC. Ractenbach’s business was inextricably connected to member of the Zanu elite. He also had a close relationship with Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was the minister for Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and in charge of the military occupation of the DRC.

There were important black businesses involved. The general manager of the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation (ZMDC) Isiah Puzengwe was also a shareholder of Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (Osleg) though privately owed it was regarded as the commercial unit of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF). The other three share-holders included the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, the commander of the ZDF (General Vitalis Zvinavashe) and the acting general manager of the Minerals Marketing Corporation if Zimbabwe.  But again it was the military already inside the DRC and aware of the commercial opportunities that were the first to engage in business. There was an important layer of Zimbabwean parastatals that also had significant interests in the DRC, stretching from the Forestry Commission to Air Zimbabwe. While management in many of these companies asserted their independence from the state, they often succumbed to government pressure to take advantage of opportunities in the DRC. The ability of smaller businesses and military official to exploit informal and casual commercial opportunities often eluded larger parastatals. In late 2001 one observer could note that most ventures involving Zimbabwean parastatals were still at the planing stage, “Clearly this type of investment is long-term, but there are enormous hurdles to overcome before such joint ventures become a reality on the ground”.[36]

Perhaps there is no better example of the reality of the war than a white Zimbabwean-based transport operator (Billy Ractenbach) heading a DRC mining parastatal (Gecamines). However this also exposes another myth of the war. It was assumed that Zimbabwe's principle motivation in the war would be the exploitation of mining operations. Where these existed they often proved unprofitable. The commercial units of ZDF and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) and the joint ventures that they formed yielded little. Even the elaborate project that included Osleg, Comiex and Oryyx Zimcom (itself a joint venture between the ZDF and Oryx Natural Resources) was facing a questionable future.

The picture that emerges shows the haphazard and chaotic nature of business opportunities. The government contributed to a get rich fever in the Congo that was hard to justify, for those without close connections to the ruling party. As a result of this hysteria the late 1990s small traders risk their life saving on risky business ventures that invariably collapsed. When the Home Affairs Minster Dumiso Dadengwa urged his constituents to 'make a killing' in the Congo 78 women uprooted to the Zambia/DRC border with a lorry carrying their pooled resources, only to see their goods stolen and their precious investment lost. Where investment happened it was largely due to a cajoling government, acutely aware of the decline in the Zimbabwean economy since ESAP and an encroaching political crisis.

This may give the impression that Zimbabwe has not been rewarded for their efforts. In truth their motivations became quickly dominated by the need to gain access to mining areas. By 2000 they had secured the right to exploit two of the country’s principal diamond areas, Tshibwe and Senga Senga. They were given the exclusive rights for 25 years.  The timing could not have been better. As the international community isolated Zanu-PF, the regime exported DRC diamonds through South Africa securing a steady flow of foreign exchange into Harare. Zimbabwe was never alone, neither in their intervention to help Kabila nor the exploitation of minerals. Namibia and Angola also insisted that their intervention be rewarded with vital diamond concessions. At the same time that Zimbabwe was granted the two richest reserves of diamonds in the country Namibia received a concession in Tshikapa and Angola sought similar concessions close to its border with the DRC.[37]


Minerals and multinationals

From the first war in 1996 multinational mining companies played a central role in the conflict. In the ensuing chaos and war that followed in 1998 they were essential elements in fuelling the conflict. This is not equivalent to arguing that they managed to implement a consistent and coherent policy that resulted in the development of the concessions that were bought from rebels and the Kinshasa government from 1996. American Mineral Fields were important to Kabila's movement, promoting and supporting his accession to power.  The Ba-N’Daw report to the UN (2001) describes how the company was involved in mining exploitation before 1998.

By the time of the second war the same company purchased diamond concessions in the Cuango Valley along the Congolese/Angolan border from a firm of Belgian speculators. This was a familiar pattern; entrepreneurs often from Belgium would acquire concessions and then sell them on at hugely increased prices to bigger players. The joint venture that resulted in the Cuango Valley deal was celebrated by the company in a press release in 1996 "The joint venture asset is a 3,700 km mining lease in the Cuanngo Valley, and a 36,000 sq. prospecting lease which borders the mining lease in the north. The total area is approximately the size of Switzerland.”[38]

The venality of corporate interests in the Congo was never far from the surface. On the other side of the war in 1998 international mining companies were heavily implicated in rebel movements. The RCD-Goma was motivated in their war against Kabila's forces partly by the need to restore a mining concession for a Canadian firm. Indeed the so-called Mining Minster for the RCD signed an agreement in 1999 with the same firm for a separate deal. Madsen notes how western mining companies benefited from the de facto partition of the country into separate zones of political control. First, the mineral exploiters from Rwanda and Uganda concentrated on pillaging gold and diamonds from eastern Congo. Now, they have increasingly turned their attention to coltan.[39]

Rwanda and Uganda have conducted the great part of the mineral exploitation in the Congo. Western companies have then bought the minerals exported by these countries, presenting a convenient cover for their involvement in the war. The cover however was blown by the UN report on the illegal export of minerals. While the World Bank funded and praised Rwanda and Uganda (the UK’s International Development Secretary Clare Short went so far as to describe the Rwandan President Paul Kagame as a ‘darling’) for being model students of economic stability and openness their economic success was being built on the exploitation of Congolese minerals sold to western companies. The extent of this support cannot be overestimated.[40] Countries with few natural resources of their own started to export large quantities of coltan, cobalt and gold. The 'staff-monitored' programmes of the World Bank and the IMF despite repeated calls for ‘transparency’ never questioned the export of minerals unknown to these countries. For example Rwanda's balance of payments increased from $26 million in 1997 to $51.5 million in 1999, under the noses of the World Bank and IMF boffins. In Uganda to claims that the World Bank was not aware the UN investigating panel was scathing, "Notes exchanged between World Bank staff clearly show that the Bank was informed about a significant increase in gold and diamond exports from a country that produces very little of these minerals or exports quantities of gold that it could not produce”.[41]

The majority of western companies that imported Congo’s minerals through Rwanda were European. During this period the Rwandan Revenue Authority lists thirty five of the largest companies, of which twelve were based in Belgium and five each in Germany and the Netherlands. Coltan in all the cases was the largest import.  The benefits for Rwanda are clear. The re-exportation of minerals from the DRC provided more than 7% of the country’s foreign earnings in 1999 and 2000. This comprised 7-8 % of the country’s foreign earnings.  Over the same period, revenue from the re-export of coltan covered the entire cost of fighting the war and arming the rebels. A similar pattern can be seen in Uganda - the export of diamonds rose from $0.2m in 1997 to $3.8 m three years later.[42]

So, from the start, western interests played a central role in the unfolding of the war, causing allies to become sworn enemies at an alarming rate. By 1999 Uganda and Rwanda had parted company and fought each other in the north and east of the Congo. That left the region divided by rebel groups funded by a new alliance of neighbouring countries. The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma), led by Adolphe Onosumbe, were funded and supported by the Rwandans and controlled the whole of eastern Congo, northern Katanga and parts of central Congo. There was also the RCD-Bunia  (known as RCD-ML) based in Bunia and led by a professor: Ernest Wamba da Wamba, supported by the Ugandans and installed in far northeastern Congo. The third major rebel group that emerged in the first two years of the war was the Mouvement de Liberation Congolais (MLC) that was led by a cell-phone entrepreneur Jean Pierre Bemba and also supported by Uganda. Bemba's group was based in Ghadolite. After a year of the war the country was effectively partitioned between these groups and countries. By the end of the first year of fighting the warring militias and rebels agreed to sign a peace accord in Lusaka. The agreement  was used by the groups and their national sponsors to rearm and then to return to conflict. The fighting that followed led to the expansion of territory held by Rwanda and their Congolese allies.[43] Rwanda still maintained that their intervention was motivated by a desire to rid eastern Congo of the interhahamwe. The progress of the war should be sufficient evidence against these claims. In 2002 one interhahamwe fighter expressed Rwanda’s motivation well, “During the last years of the war we have not fought the RPF a lot. We think that they are tired of the war like us. Anyway, they are not in the Congo to hunt us, as they pretend. I have seen them exploit the gold and coltan mines and we see how they attack the population. It is for these reasons that they are here.”[44]

The IMF, criminality, and the partition of the Congo

It has become fashionable to talk about failed states in Africa. The ‘complex’ political emergency in the Great Lakes in the late 1990s was regarded as symptomatic of the criminalisation of the state in Africa. But the DRC was not alone and the category seemed to fit a number of states in Africa at the end of the 1990s. Jean-Francois Bayart is the most well-known theorist of the African state describes, "the process of criminalisation ... has become the dominant trait of the sub-continent in which the state has literally imploded under the combined effects of economic crisis, neo-liberal programs of structural adjustment and the loss of legitimacy of political institutions”.[45]

The Congo, however, reveals an essential fallacy in this thesis. Theorists of the failed state understate the extent of western influence in the failures they lament. As we have seen the involvement of international business in the Congo has sustained the war and the regional governments that have been involved in the conflict. There is no clearer example of these processes than the report issued by the UN in April 2001. The UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of National Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of Congo were devastating in their conclusions. Although the report has been criticised for being partisan, and the question of ‘legality’ in the Congo seems to be a self-evident absurdity, they argue that foreign companies “were ready to do business regardless of elements of unlawfulness ... Companies trading minerals which the Panel considered to be the engine of the conflict in the Congo, have prepared the field for illegal mining activities in the country”.[46]

We can see that war stems not simply from the desire of neighbouring countries to control the Congo’s minerals. The reasons are tied to the global restructuring of capitalism. The collapse of Mobutu was significant because it represented – after years of painful adjustment and crisis – the replacement of one state form with another. Mobutu had heralded from an earlier period of state control – epitomised by his short-lived project of Zairisation - that was impossible to sustain in an era that combined the global collapse of commodity prices and the geo-political earthquake in 1989. It is tempting to argue that Kabila was always doomed to failure in a country that had been fundamentally transformed by these processes. What is certain is that they unravelled the country and prepared it for war and partition.

The new Congo – informalised and artisanal - would be fundamentally unlike its previous incarnations. In a world dominated by private capital after 1989 it was possible to conceive of the country permanently partitioned for the first time. As usual the US republican right led the way. Walter Kansteiner entertained this notion in 1996, when he called for a division of the Great Lakes region “that would probably necessitate redrawing the international boundaries and would require massive voluntary relocation efforts.” Four years later he was beating the same drum stating that the “break up of the Congo is more likely now than it has been in 20 or 30 years”.[47]  Today his cynicism has become reality. The partition of the DRC has already taken place and the new territory is, once again, saturated with rebels, mercenaries, foreign countries and western mineral companies. 


[21] Cited in The Times 22 April 1997

[22] L. Martens Kabila et la Révolution congolaise, panafricanisme ou neocolonialisme? Tome 1. (Éditions EPO, 2002) p. 15.

[23] D. Seddon ‘Democratic Transition in Zaire’ unpublished.

[24] Braeckman, Les Nouveaux Prédateurs  p.183.

[25] Ibid-p. 184.

[26] Ibid-p. 185.

[27] Cited in Seddon unpublished.

[28] Martens Kabila et la Révolution congolaise p.423.

[29] Cited ibid p. 420

[30] M. Nest ‘Ambitions, profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the DRC’ in African Affairs 2001 pp.469-490. Nest’s article is extremely revealing on Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war and the argument presented here draws heavily from his evidence.

[31] See for a general overview L. Zeilig ‘Crisis in Zimbabwe’ in International Socialism 2: 93 2002

[32] M. Nest ‘Ambitions, profits and Loss’.

[33] United Nations (2001) pp 33-35

[34] M. Gwisai Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe (Harare: ISO pamphlet, 2002) pp.11-14.

[35] Cited in Nest ‘Ambitions, profits and Loss’ p. 476

[36] Ibid p.483

[37] Samset, ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC’ pp. 475-6

[38] Madsen Congressional Subcommittee on International Operations

[39] Madsen Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999

[40] Rwanda was given $80 million in aid by Britain in 2000.

[41] United Nations (2001) p.38

[42] Samset ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict?’ p. 475.

[43] G. de Villers, J. Omasombo and E. Kennes Republique démocratique du Congo. Guere et politique, les trentwe derniers mois de Laurent-Désiré Kabila, aout 1998-janvier 2001 (L’Harmatten, 2001).

[44] Braeckman Les Nouveaux Prédateurs pp.199-200.

[45] J. F Bayart, J. Ellis and Hibou The Criminalisation of the State (James Currey, 2000) p. 19

[46] United Nations (2001) p.19

[47] Cited in New African September 2001 p.22




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