This is a short version of a chapter which will be forthcoming in
Leo Zeilig, ed. Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa (New Clarion
Press, June 2002).
The modern history of Egypt begins in the 1870s. The local regime attempted
to buy its way to prosperity, investing in the Suez Canal, plus machinery
for cotton and sugar production. French and British banks were happy
to offer loans at high rates of interest, less happy when the state
defaulted on its debts. Representatives from European banks established
in 1879 a Commission for the Egyptian Public Debt, under their supervision.
Even the Times correspondent in Alexandria admitted to feelings of guilt,
writing that 'when one thinks of the poverty-stricken, overdriven, under-paid
fellaheen [peasants] in their miserable hovels, working late and early
to fill the pockets of the creditors, the punctual payment of the coupon
ceases to be wholly a subject of gratification.'
The first acts of resistance were revolts by
the peasants taking to the hills as outlaws. By 1880 an urban movement
had gathered around a group of officers in the Egyptian army, led by
Colonel 'Urabi. A radical press developed,
critical of the Khedive and the European advisers in his cabinet. Small
traders, artisans and radical intellectuals took part in protests. The
first strike movement in Egyptian history took place in April 1882 among
coal-heavers at Port Said and Suez on the Canal. Shortly afterwards
British troops were sent in. Egypt was not a British protectorate, colony
or dominion. But it was 'under British influence'. The presence of Imperial
troops linked Egypt to Britain and also ensured that the local economy
was tied in to the global market.
One significant effect of the British occupation
of Egypt was that it stunted the growth of an Arabic-speaking native
bourgeoisie. Throughout the 1920s, the reins of colonial control were
loosened, but British business retained a firm hold on Egyptian economic
life. Growth was also hampered by crippling debts to British banks.
Before the outbreak of the second world war, up to thirty per cent of
annual revenue was taken by debt charges. The Economist estimated that
of the £200,000,000 of shares in Egypt in 1947, just 10 per cent
was owned by indigenous capitalists.
It was the second world war that finally transformed
the Egyptian economy. Whole new branches of industry were created to
fill the gaps in supplies. Production grew in textiles, food, chemicals,
glass, leather, cement and petroleum. The British Middle East Supply
Centre (MESC) gave help to industrialists wishing to expand. Yet the
suspension of foreign capital was not continued after 1945. Agriculture
was weakened and unable to meet the demands of a growing population.
Workers began to articulate class demands against native capital, as
well as opposing the British occupation. Under wartime conditions, the
number of industrial labourers increased to over 1,500,000 in 1946.
Through the 1940s, the nationalist movement vacillated
between its desire to push for Egyptian independence from Britain and
its fear of the native working class. In December 1945, the textile
workers of Shubra al-Khayma in Cairo came under military occupation
as wage disputes spiralled into a full-time confrontation with the government.
On 6 September 1947, strikes broke out at the huge Misr Spinning mill
in the Delta town of Mahalla al-Kubra, the very heart of Egyptian capitalism.
Although walk-outs were not yet successful, they led to further struggles
throughout the winter of 1947-8. There were mass strikes again in 1950
and 1952.
The workers looked to existing parties for leadership,
and Communists found themselves at the head of the movement. Although
there was no single Communist Party, New Dawn and the Democratic Movement
for National Liberation (DMNL) were both influential in the unions.
Like other Stalinist formations across the Third World, the Egyptian
Communists maintained that liberation had to come in stages. First the
Egyptian bourgeoisie would emancipate itself from British rule, and
only much later could workers' issues come to the fore. This strategy
meant that the Communists and their supporters rejected the idea that
workers could seek power. Instead the DMNL sought tirelessly for a 'progressive'
ruling class ally that would solve the national question - and only
much later do anything for the workers. There were also dissident non-Stalinist
Marxists on the left, although their forces were far too small to have
an impact on events.
Following the Free Officers' coup of July 1952,
the DMNL and the trade union leadership called off planned transport
strikes. That August, a strike broke out in the mill town of Kafr al-Dawwar
near Alexandria. Despite workers' support for their coup, the Free Officers
hanged two strikers. Large meetings demanded action, but the workers'
leadership failed to give any focus to the movement. The DMNL and the
unions opposed sympathy action in support of the strikers. The protests
were halted, and the Free Officers banned all rival parties in January
1953. Faced with the new regime, the network of solidarity which had
been built up out of years of struggle fractured. Over the next few
years, the Free Officers repaid the Communists for their support by
smashing their organisations, banning their press and torturing their
activists.
The regime of Gamal Abd al-Nasser was established
in the years immediately following the Free Officers' coup. The expansion
of the world economy during the long boom helped to build mass support
for the new regime. Nasser created a welfare state, providing jobs in
the state-owned industries, and promising to govern according to the
rules of a new 'Arab socialism'. New factories were built, the Aswan
high dam was begun to provide electricity and water for irrigation.
The size of farms was limited to 50 feddan, and some surplus land was
redistributed. The Egyptian left portrayed Nasser as an authentic socialist,
leading the Third World in its struggle against global imperialism.
Yet by the mid 1960s Nasser's state capitalist
project began to stagnate. The balance of trade deficit grew alarmingly,
prices rose and shortages became general. The economic slowdown tipped
into decline following the 1967 war with Israel. Military defeat shattered
Egypt's pride, and the economic effects were even longer-lasting, Egypt
lost control of the Sinai desert, and with it 70 per cent of national
oil production.
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat turned Egyptian
society towards 'infitah', or privatisation. Sadat announced that the
economy would be revived by Washington cash. The government offered
incentives to foreign investors, whose proceeds were exempted from taxation.
Exchange controls were loosened, and labour regulations were abolished
within the Free Zones. For many on the Egyptian left, Sadat betrayed
the Free Officers' revolution. Yet Sadat was as much a part of this
movement as his predecessor. Infitah appealed not simply to foreign
capitalists, but to large sections of the local elite. The people who
benefited were those linked to the existing structures of power.
Despite Sadat's hopes infitah solved nothing.
In 1976, average income stood at just $280 per capita - less than Thailand
or the Philippines. During the same year, the newspaper Al-Tali'ah estimated
that the purchasing power of 80 percent of the population had declined
since the October War. Ten years after beginning of infitah, Egypt had
to import 25 percent of its foodstuffs. External debt rose from $3 billion
to $24 billion.
In 1975, large protests by workers on New Year's
Day first raised an ironic slogan referring to Sadat's exploits in the
war with Israel, "Hero of the crossing- - where is our breakfast?"
The same year, the Egyptian government turned to the IMF for assistance
in plugging the spiralling budget deficit. As 1976 drew to a close a
general transport strike shook Cairo. But the greatest disturbances
were ahead.
In January 1977, press headlines announced the
government's decision to remove 228 million LE of subsidies from basic
goods, including luxury flour, maize, sugar, tea and rice. Riots broke
out in Alexandria, more than 300 were arrested after crowds attacked
the governor's residence and burnt the furniture. Protestors in Mansoura
burned down the ruling party's buildings and the headquarters of the
security forces. In Suez, demonstrators seized weapons and ammunition,
then opened fire on the police. For two days the crowds controlled the
streets. Sadat flew back from his 'rest-house' in Aswan, not knowing
whether his plane would be able to land safely.
Army units eventually restored order, and the
regime unleashed a campaign of repression. Yet before Sadat ordered
troops onto the street, he reinstated the food subsidies. The main demands
of the protestors were met within two days of the outbreak of the uprising.
The government was careful to stress that there would be no changes
to the wage rises promised at New Year.
The crisis of the 1970s provided fertile ground
for the rebirth of an Islamist movement. It was the Sadat government
which began the direct encouragement of fundamentalism. In the 1970s,
the Brotherhood's paper Al-Dawa became freely available across Egypt.
Newer and more radical organisations were first armed by the state,
at least in part to serve as a counter-weight to left-wing ideas. By
the end of the 1970s, the Islamists were confident to act independently
of the regime, and militants from one group Jihad (Holy War) were responsible
for the assassination of Sadat in 1981.
Yet despite all the dire predictions of Western
commentators, the Islamist movement in Egypt has failed to take state
power, unlike the successful Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan. Instead
they have oscillated between reformism, using front parties and working
in semi-legality around elections, and armed terrorism. Neither strategy
has so far brought significant success.
Today's Egyptian economy depends on crumbs from
America and the IMF. Privatisation continues. But the programme of structural
adjustment depends on repression. Strikes are banned, political parties
face harassment. Torture and detention without trial are commonplace.
During the mid-1990s the southern provinces of Egypt witnessed a war
of attrition between state forces and armed Islamist groups. After a
number of attacks on tourists, repression appeared to have smashed not
only the radical armed factions, but also moderate electoral groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The issue of solidarity for the Palestinian intifada
has recently been a radicalising factor in Egyptian street protests.
Following the renewal of the intifada in October 2000, thousands of
students from Cairo University fought pitched battles with the police
who attempted to stop them breaking out from the university compound.
Banners and chants on the protest attacked the Mubarak regime for its
links to Israel and America, and a groups of students, possibly inspired
by the anti-capitalist protests in Prague a few days earlier smashed
up a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant.
The long decay of the dreams of state-led development
and national liberation has laid bare the real forces in the world economy,
an international ruling class which is restless in its search for profit,
and a global working class which is increasingly bound together across
national and regional boundaries. The history of Egypt a story of bitter
class conflict. There are immense struggles to come.
